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reconsidered: boundaries are indeed being redrawn; reasoning is being made 'fit for 
practice'.  Ideas like 'person-centred care' are no longer phrases with potential to be 
helpful in some yet-to-be-clarified way: theorists and practitioners are working in 
collaboration to give them substantive import and application. 
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The story so far 
 
The editorial to the previous philosophy thematic edition of this journal[1] noted the 
extraordinary change that has taken place in discussions of reasoning, evidence and 
clinical decision-making in the context of what one important paper characterised as 
“the great rationality debate”.[2]  Once, attempts to discuss underlying questions 
that frame the debate about health research and practice – questions about the 
nature of scientific method, the importance of social context to our understanding of 
knowledge both in research and in clinical practice, the role of value judgement in 
clinical reasoning – were dismissed as “unhelpful”, “impractical” and even “anti-
scientific”.[1]  More recently, however, a broad range of commentators (including 
colleagues who could in no way be plausibly characterised as either oblivious to the 
practicalities of research and practice or indeed “anti-scientific”) have recognised the 
urgent need to address these questions, if we are to develop responses to the real 
problems that now confront us, such that health science and practice can truly 
“move forward”.[1]  Debates about the relationship between science, society and 
value are not “irrelevant” to science, but rather they are essential in defining, 
establishing and defending its relevance to humanity, in an age when science and 
reasoning are increasingly under attack.[3,4] 
 
Treating real people, in all their diversity and complexity, requires being prepared to 
re-examine fundamental assumptions about scientific method, evidence as 
understood in the on-going dialogue about evidence-based medicine (EBM) and 
evidence as needed in the clinic.  Conceptual dichotomies (such as the strict divide 
between evidence and value) that may once have played an important role in 
intellectual progress may, at this point, be holding us back in our efforts to deal with 
contemporary problems[1,5] – a situation that invites us to review the relationship 
“between science as a human activity and distinctive way of understanding 
the world, and other human activities, capac ties, and dispositions”, including 
emotional reactions, ethical attitudes, and social commitments.[1]  
 
We concluded that: 
 
“All of this suggests that, in the debate about clinical practice, we are going to have 
to be more explicit and rigorous in future in developing and defending our views 
about what is valuable in human life. This is not an alternative to the continued 
development of empirical research, but a precondition of its adequate interpretation 
and application in real world contexts.”[1] 
 
Reassured by the high quality of the contributions to the edition, and the willingness 
on the part of authors to examine critically their own assumptions and to challenge 
established preconceptions, we confidently predicted that the 'great rationality 
debate' would indeed move forward, “in the sense of developing ideas and 
arguments to enable the cultivation of good judgement in clinical practice.” 
 
We are delighted to report that, in the year following these comments, we have 
received a vast amount of correspondence and submissions from some of the most 
insightful and influential commentators in health research and practice, taking this 
”great debate” forward in just the way we had hoped. This thematic edition of the 
Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice (the largest single edition of the JECP in its 
24 year history) includes over fifty papers, reviews and reports of conferences[6-57] 
that reflect the attention being given across the board – by practitioners, guidelines 
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developers, systematic reviewers and philosophers – to the relationship between 
evidence, science, context, bias, truth, value and methodology, with the 
quintessentially pragmatic goal to develop accounts of these concepts to assist 
decision-making in practice.  It includes specific sections consisting of papers 
delivered to major conferences on diagnostic categories (focussing on both their 
limitations[27-34] and their over-use[19-26]), clinical guidelines[35-41] and 
mechanisms in medicine.[42-44] Contributors discuss the latest developments in 
evidence-based healthcare, person-centred care and the relationship between health 
and social care. The edition also includes a section consisting of expert commentaries 
on the Grading of Recommendations, Assessment, Development and Evaluation 
(GRADE) framework.[45-53]  These contributions include proposals to develop 
GRADE, to provide a “sorely needed missing link” between Clinical Practice 
Guidelines and patient outcomes, thus “connecting decision science to clinical 
care”;[51] critical discussion of these proposals [52,53] and work identifying ways to 
avoid the “pitfalls” of GRADE while drawing on its strengths.[45] The edition 
concludes with reviews of recently published texts addressing pressing conceptual 
and practical problems for medical science and health practice,[54-56] followed by a 
paper in the Debates section, responding directly to a paper in the previous thematic 
edition.[57] 
 
Science, context and value: Expanding conceptions, rethinking categories 
 
The edition opens with a discussion of the relationship between truth and bias in 
Evidence-based Healthcare(EBHC). While the concept of truth has been extensively 
debated within philosophy, Sietse Wieringa and colleagues argue persuasively that 
its operation in EBHC remains “hidden and almost undisputed through the linked 
concept of bias”.[6]  They provide a helpful summary of different theories of truth 
and its relationship to knowledge, facts, interests and social reality, using a case 
study to illustrate the problems in applying dominant approaches to truth and bias in 
EBHC to the single case scenario.  Citing approvingly authors such as Nussbaum,[58] 
they argue that facts are “invariably value-laden” and that EBHC needs to develop a 
more nuanced view of the relationship between truth and bias, if it is to prevent 
unwarranted relativism in an era of “alternative facts, factoids and post truths”. 
 
The need for clinical education and broader professional debate to focus more 
specifically on issues of value, is strongly supported by the empirical work and 
analysis of Christopher Mayes and colleagues.[7] Investigating the views of 
Australian medical students on the influence of commercial interests on medical 
practice, researchers found that students typically “uncritically appealed to science in 
the abstract as a management solution for conflicts of interest”. Further, the specific 
conception of science espoused by students corresponds to a framework identified in 
philosophical literature as “scientism”.[5] The authors argue that a “scientistic style 
of reasoning is reinforced through medical curricula” that “marginalise” the study of 
ethics. They conclude that students need to be made aware “of the epistemological 
assumptions that underpin science, medicine and EBM in order to address the ethical 
challenges associated with commercialised healthcare”. 
 
Continuing the theme of science, evidence and bias, Scott Eustace argues that new 
technologies, while frequently improving the reliability, efficiency and availability of 
medical research, can also introduce profound new sources of bias that current EBM 
frameworks do not accommodate.[8] Using numerous examples to show how 
technology “informs the extent to which we value different sources of evidence”, 
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Eustace proposes augmenting EBM models in response to the changing nature of 
evidence. 
 
Andrew Jones and Daniel Steel suggest that debate on the use of evidence 
hierarchies pays insufficient attention to how clinicians evaluate medical evidence 
and make decisions in real world contexts.[9] Exploring how different contexts 
influence the value of using evidence evaluation techniques (EETs), the authors 
sanction applying simple EETs to the “best” available evidence when clinicians must 
promptly manage uncertainty over how to manage an individual patient. In contrast, 
thorough assessments and integration of multiple types of evidence are needed for 
the extended, collaborative development of practice guidelines. Even in the latter 
context however, evaluating all available evidence may not be feasible or productive.  
 
In an important paper that resonates with the conclusions of both Wieringa et al[6] 
and Mayes et al,[7] Bjorn Hofmann and colleagues discuss the relationship between 
fact and value in health technology assessment (HTA).[10] Explaining the crucial role 
that philosophy (in particular ethics) plays in addressing the relationship between 
facts and values in HTA, they defend an Aristotelian “middle way” between the 
traditional positivist account of “evaluating facts” and the social-constructivist 
account of “facting values,” which they label “factuation”. Like Wieringa et al, they 
stress the importance of being clear on this relationship and its implications for valid 
inference in an era of “fake facts” and “truth production.”[10] 
 
Patrick Daly presents a model of clinical reasoning integrating diagnosis, prognosis, 
and therapeutic decision-making, focussing on the operations of knowing and doing 
performed by persons engaged in the direct care of patients.[11] Daly's concern is to 
provide “a methodical way to study questions regarding the operations of clinical 
reasoning as well as what constitutes significant clinical data, clinical expertise, and 
virtuous healthcare practice”. The paper provides appealing discussions of intuition 
and case-based reasoning. Like Hofmann et al[10], Daly makes use of Aristotelian 
insights regarding reasoning and knowledge to develop his own account of evidence 
and value in the treatment of individual patients. 
 
The relationship between fact, value and diagnosis has for many years been a major 
preoccupation of discussions of psychiatry, with many authors assuming (in line with 
the “scientistic” preconceptions identified by Mayes et al[7]) that only value-neutral 
diagnostic criteria are compatible with psychiatry's status as a legitimate scientific 
discipline.[59,60] In his detailed analysis of this debate to date, Diogo Telles-Corriea 
makes the interesting point that only the employment of value-laden (harm) criteria 
keeps psychiatry in line with broader medical practices.[12] 
 
The criterion of harm, as employed in general medical diagnosis, is also a key 
preoccupation of the first of two single-authored papers by Bjorn Hofmann,[13,14] 
both of which draw on ideas about facts and values informing his co-authored 
paper.[10] Addressing a problem that becomes the key focus of the next section of 
this edition, that of overdiagnosis, Hofmann argues that contemporary scientific tests 
give “great opportunities for earlier and more precise diagnostics” but they can also 
“expand disease, produce patients, and cause unnecessary harm”, increasing costs 
and  leading to overtreatment.  Hofmann warns that, unless we correct the errors 
that lead us to “decouple diagnostics from harm”, scientific medicine risks becoming 
“like the ancient tragic hero Oedipus, succumbing because of his very best abilities in 
the search for knowledge”.[13]  In the paper that follows, Hofmann begins to 
develop a person-centred and value-laden solution to this major problem, addressing 
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the serious difficulties associated with counter-factual reasoning by “getting 
personal” on overdiagnosis. Hofmann explains that this involves “directing the 
attention of overdiagnosis estimates towards what matters in medicine: the 
experience of individual persons.”[14] This approach “challenges traditional 
epistemic hierarchies in Evidence Based Medicine”, focusing debates in future on the 
development of person-centred approaches and shared decision-making. 
 
A similarly person-centred approach to the problems of evaluation in wound care is 
developed in admirable detail by Fania Pagnamenta and Monique Lhussier.[15] The 
authors note that “developing a body of evidence for dressing selection is fraught 
with methodological challenges,” arguing that the traditional dominance of a 
conception of “value-free” science in EBM discourse has seriously compounded these 
problems.  They propose a solution based on the work of pragmatist philosopher 
John Dewey, using his framework of 'experimentalism' to outline a series of practical 
methods for incorporating patient stories and values, as well as staff perspectives 
and expertise, into the decision-making process. 
 
Their paper is followed by two articles focussing on the relationship between health 
and social factors.  Stefania Cobbinah and Janice Lewis discuss the demonstrable and 
yet, they argue, under-researched relationship between racism, in both institutional 
and cultural forms, and public health.[16]  They note that engagement with the 
overtly political and evaluative issues of collective well-being, civil rights and 
addressing educational injustice is a pre-requisite for a meaningful commitment to 
improving public health, illustrating their argument with reference to the 
achievements of, and problems for, attempts to address racialised health 
inequalities.  Ramesh Prasad discusses attempts to explain the sex disparity in living 
kidney donation, with females being “consistently overrepresented among living 
donors”.[17]  To understand this, Prasad calls for multi-disciplinary collaboration 
among medical, feminist, and public health scholars in kidney donor research, with 
the goal of improving both short- and long-term living kidney donor outcomes. 
 
The section ends with a paper exploring the philosophical foundations of the 
developing movement for person-centred medicine(PCM). Thomas Fröhlich discusses 
the use of the terms “centre” and “inside” in general discourse, in philosophy and in 
relation to the idea of “person-centredness”, proposing a “conceptual framework 
corresponding to PCM”.[18] He attempts to apply a “polycentric grid approach” to 
replace what he identifies as the rival Cartesian, orthogonal grid, discussing the 
implications of the approach for attempts contained in recent UK guidelines to “tailor 
healthcare services for each patient”. 
 
Too much medicine 
 
This section presents papers from a conference held at Oxford University in April 
2017.  Its theme was overdiagnosis in the broadest sense, including not only the 
problems Hofmann identified with novel tests[13], but also the unnecessary 
pathologizing of a wide range of social and behavioural problems and traits.  In their 
engaging conference report, the organisers, Jeremy Howick and Susanne Uusitalo, 
characterise the problem of “Too much medicine” as “disease mongering, whereby 
diseases are arguably invented, or at least the thresholds for what counts as a 
disease, are lowered”.[19]  As their report makes clear, a key goal of the conference 
was to facilitate dialogue and collaboration between philosophers and medical 
researchers to address this problem, persuading medical scientists to engage with 
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philosophical methods of analysis, and philosophers to “get their hands dirty with 
data”. 
 
Jonathan Livingstone-Banks explains nosology as “the science of defining and 
classifying diseases”, and meta-nosology as “the study of how we do this”.[20]  His 
paper illustrates the need for everyone involved in diagnosis to think about the 
philosophical assumptions that frame the diagnostic process, including pragmatic 
issues regarding why we gather certain problems together under particular headings 
and the assumptions we make about the reality of disease: “any definitive schema 
for disease must be sufficiently backed by an underlying theory of medical ontology”. 
 
Wendy Rogers and Mary Walker propose a solution to the problem of overdiagnosis 
by developing an account of a précising definition of disease.[21] Challenging the 
notion that disease is a concept whose vagueness may contribute to overdiagnosis, 
the authors stipulate what constitutes disease in the context of combating 
overdiagnosis (diseaseODx). They suggest that a condition is a diseaseODx if and 
only if it is characterized by dysfunction that carries a significant risk of causing 
severe harm.  After defining the concepts of dysfunction, risk and harm, the authors 
test their definition in practice and show how currently over-diagnosed clinical 
conditions, such as well-differentiated micro-papillary thyroid cancer, are not 
diseases in the absence of revised diagnostic criteria. 
 
A different solution is proposed in the paper by Huw Llewelyn, which raises concerns 
about “the scope and conventions” of EBM.[22]  Llewelyn outlines a number of ways 
in which this scope could be widened to combat the problem of “too much medicine”.   
They include broadening the range of evidence to be considered and methodological 
proposals for “balancing the probabilities of beneficial outcomes against the 
probabilities of harmful outcomes and other costs”. 
 
Taking up Livingstone-Banks' challenge to engage in meta-nosology, Benjamin 
Smart and colleagues illustrate the problems in this area with reference to the 
classification of “Chronic Kidney Disease”(CKD).[23] They point out that this phrase 
functions as an “umbrella term” covering an unduly wide range of kidney health 
states.  Drawing on analyses of disease in philosophy literature, and arguments 
about the well-being of patients, they argue that “the most prevalent stages of CKD 
are not, in fact, diseases”.  They note that an attentive study of the philosophy of 
medicine on the part of medical policy-makers would lead to a change in practice, to 
the benefit of patients. 
 
Examining factors affecting avoidable hospitalisation for nursing home residents, 
Petra Mäkelä notes that professionals must “navigate a grey area in clinical decision 
making about whether to send a resident to hospital for medical treatment, in which 
they balance perceived risks and wellbeing with moral and ethical tensions”.[24] A 
greater understanding is needed of the factors affecting avoidable transfers to a 
hospital environment for elderly patients, as such transfers can be associated with 
increased morbidity, mortality and a reduced quality of life. Using Judith Butler's 
work on performativity, Mäkelä considers ways to respond to the “medicalisation of 
frailty” and to develop a more person-centred approach to practice in this area. 
 
With their focus on person-centred approaches, both Mäkelä's paper and the 
contribution that follows it, by Saloni de Souza,[25] very much resonate with the 
contributions to the following section of the edition, on 'Rethinking Disease'.  While 
(on some definitions, at least) it is tautological that illness is bad for us, de Souza 
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notes that, in the context of the lives of specific persons, conditions typically classed 
as illnesses may indeed be preferable to health.  Failure to recognise this on the part 
of clinicians can lead to over-treatment.  In urging practitioners to look at the whole 
context of a patient's life, including “values, circumstances, identity, goals and 
projects”, de Souza advocates an approach in line with advocates of person-centred 
care in previous editions of this journal.  Her proposals for adapting the consultation 
model put us in mind of the work of Yelovich on treating the clinical encounter as a 
“meeting of experts”,[61] and as noted they are taken up in some depth in the 
contributions to this edition on 'Rethinking Disease'. 
 
The final paper in this section provides a very powerful illustration of the immense 
practical significance of the philosophical questions raised by numerous authors in 
this issue of the journal, regarding objectivity, truth, interests and value (epistemic 
and ethical).  Lynette Reid shows that our assumptions about objectivity as an 
“epistemic ideal”, and associated ontological assumptions about the nature of 
disease, can lead to dangerously oversimplified conclusions about medical 
imaging.[26]  She illustrates this point with reference to breast cancer screening and 
thyroid cancer diagnosis, showing how the assumption (to many of us, a “natural” 
one) that improvements in the technical quality of imaging will lead to greater 
accuracy, reliability and precision, is simplistic and fails to take into account that 
these “dimensions of objectivity” may be in tension with each other in practice. She 
concludes with an allusion to Wittgenstein, to the effect that sometimes “an indistinct 
picture” can be “exactly what we need”. 
 
Rethinking disease 
 
Looking not from the perspective of research, medical education, or the politics of 
clinical professions, but from that of treatment and persons in treatment, why are 
diagnostic categories limited, what are their limits, and what steps can be taken to 
overcome them and improve practice and care? The first 5 contributions under this 
heading deal with this major concern and offer various answers. The occasion for 
most papers included here was the conference “Rethinking Disease: New Theoretical 
Foundations for Clinical Treatment”, organized in November 2017 at the University of 
Bucharest by Alexandra Pârvan and Jennifer Radden. Addressing also medicine taken 
broadly, the event was centred on proposing new ways to construe psychiatric 
categories that would better serve both patient and clinician needs for good practice, 
drawing on knowledge from a broad range of areas, including the sociology of 
psychiatry, medical anthropology, phenomenology, metaphysics, and art. 
 
This section raises issues such as: the ontology of disease/disorder – discrete 
biological entities vs. dimensional network entities, or meta-biological, non-fixed, 
person-dependent states;[27,30] the interplay of history of medicine, history of 
psychiatry, and cultural history in making up the identity of mental disorder 
[27,30,31]; fictitious clinical categories, futile diagnoses, the utility of diagnostic 
categories[27,28]; popular culture stereotypes of certain mental disorders and the 
role these[31,31] as well as communal attitudes play in the life of the mentally ill 
[33,34]; stigma [31,32,34]; capability focused vs. deficit centred care [27,32,33]; 
the possibility of living well within illness [27,33,34]. 
 
Alexandra Pârvan[27] develops a case against treatment dominantly based on 
diagnostic categories in somatic or psychiatric settings. The case is supported with 
arguments from metaphysics, qualitative healthcare studies, cultural history, and 
Page 7 of 20 Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice
For peer review only
history of psychiatry. The alternative, person-centred model of care proposed uses 
resources and frameworks of analysis typical to metaphysics and art, that can be 
imported in clinical settings without requiring expertise in metaphysics or art from 
the practising clinician. The concept of the “mind electric” is introduced as the 
psychiatric counterpart of the “body electric”, which she developed in previous work 
published in this journal.[62] Both denote a patient’s personal state of health within 
illness, which is independent of clinical categories and biochemical, physical data, 
and both ground her demonstration that health is for each person something 
irregular, specific to that person, which cannot be produced with the instruments of 
science alone – something like Van Gogh’s purple cornfield.[27] Hence the restated, 
leitmotif claim in Pârvan’s work that metaphysical care[63] is a requirement of good 
practice. Her distinctive version of person-centred care is developed in opposition to 
what she regards as the standardized, “black-box” treatments aimed at addressing 
disease categories instead of treating persons and seeking to generate personal 
states of health in them. The pivotal point in the case against these “black-box” 
treatments rests in an empirical, case-based, multi-layered demonstration that the 
full identity of disease is only given in its relation with the person and never by 
diagnosis alone. 
 
Heinz Katschnig[28] offers a clinician’s viewpoint of how Pârvan’s critique of the use 
of diagnostic categories in clinical practice might have limited application and require 
future nuancing regarding the specific contexts of care in order to “win over 
clinicians”. He endorses Pârvan’s “electric” concept, which affirms health as a 
personal reality, independent of physical evidence, and the need for non-
standardized treatments that results from this. Katschnig, however, sees a split 
between medical school training, medical research, and payment systems, all of 
which heavily rely on clinical categories and scientific medicine, and the actual 
clinical practice, where diagnostic categories are not as dominant as Pârvan avers. 
The “electric” proposal, he suggests, should take into consideration the fact that 
medical practice often involves fuzzy, or multi-morbidity, or primary care situations 
where the doctor is little able to use guideline or standardized treatment, as well as 
clear-cut situations, such as infectious diseases, radiology or surgery cases where 
treatment ruled by diagnosis is perhaps desirable. In addition, Katschnig argues that 
psychiatric care is fundamentally different from somatic care, such that a critique of 
one-size-fits-all treatments can barely apply to it, and, again, is valid only with 
respect to biological psychiatry done mostly in academia. In contrast, the 
requirements inherent to the working contexts of practising psychiatrists preclude 
them from offering treatment guided by diagnoses. As further proof of that, the 
utility of diagnostic categories, challenged by Pârvan when taken in absolute, has 
also been recently questioned by the World Psychiatric Association.  
 
George Graham’s commentary[29] on Pârvan takes on board her point about 
treatment based on diagnostic categories not being able to provide best care. He 
calls it the “Particularist Thesis”, and discusses its worth and its links with 
fundamental issues in mental healthcare. Under the same diagnosis one could find 
no common causal pathway in two persons, such that their conditions can be 
considered and need to be treated as different. Pârvan argues against an approach 
of disease-in-a-person as a purely negative entity and, along this line, Graham 
speaks of the epistemic quality that an illness can have for the person suffering it. 
Pârvan stresses that a view of disease as “all bad” ignores the normal processes 
involved in it, and patients’ experience of chronic diseases as their personal 
normality. Pressing on a similar point, Graham assumes the position he calls 
“Purpose Driven Continuum Theory”, holding that the line between mental health and 
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illness can be drawn for the same case in various places, depending on the clinician’s 
specialization, or the various purposes and contexts of the clinical encounter. Like 
Pârvan, Graham is against rigid work with discrete diagnostic categories or, as he 
puts it, forcing the mind “into unnatural divisions and joints”. Also with Pârvan, 
Graham maintains that such a position does not deny shareable features of a 
disorder, but claims that the patient cannot be addressed as the host of a disorder 
full stop: it is always only someone’s disorder that requires treatment.  
 
Arguing against descriptions of psychiatric disorders as categorical, discrete entities, 
Jennifer Radden[30] suggests as possible source for the manifold current flaws of the 
DSM and ICD disease classification systems, the bacterial model of disease launched 
in the 19th century, of which she discusses “syphilis” as a typical case. A more 
fitting, not strictly biological model of mental disorder had already been provided in 
the early modern conception of “melancholy”, especially as portrayed by Robert 
Burton. His analysis of this disorder has much in common with the current “network 
model” approach to classifying and understanding mental illness, which conflicts with 
the DSM position with respect to the latter’s categorical nosology and causal 
presuppositions. Thus, the psychiatric disorder is not seen as a natural kind, with 
stable biological attributes common to all cases. Instead, it is seen as a loosely 
bounded dimensional entity that presents like a network of relatively stable sets of 
traits and epistemically relevant diverse symptoms, in multi-directional interactions 
and feed-back loops between mind-body-world. Mental disorder cannot be attributed 
to a single cause and cannot be addressed with “magic bullet” drug-treatments, as is 
typical in biologically-based models of disease; remedial responses to it need to be 
accommodated to the multiple, causally interconnected specific networks that build 
its diagnostic identity. 
 
Heinz Katschnig’s diachronic analysis of the diagnostic identity of schizophrenia[31] 
shows it as a hybrid, artificial, scientifically ungrounded, made-up entity. It was 
composed throughout a historical process of picking up bits and pieces from three 
major descriptions of schizophrenia and mixing them up into a diagnostic category 
that significantly conflicts with all three original descriptions taken separately. 
Importantly, the resulting category retains from all three accounts exactly those 
elements most able to generate stigma and harm the patients: that schizophrenia is 
a chronic brain disease, incurable and degenerative; that, given its name, it entails 
incoherent, disintegrated, erratic behaviour and affect, which encouraged the “split 
personality” image in popular culture; and that is defined by hallucinations and 
delusions, which, again, for the general public are notorious manifestations of 
“craziness”. The search for something easy to identify, assess, define, classify and 
ameliorate with drugs led to the “invention” of a scientifically non-legitimate, not 
valid clinical category. This disease entity serves not the patients but the pretence of 
scientificity associated with the DSM discrete disease entities approach, the 
pharmaceutics industry which is able to produce drugs that address particular 
symptoms (e.g. hallucinations and delusions), and the politics of the profession, 
which identifies itself as a branch of biological medicine. 
 
Katschnig’s historical investigation shows the diagnostic category of schizophrenia to 
be an invention of psychiatrists, which fuelled an ungrounded, stigmatizing public 
image of the affected persons as dangerous, unpredictable, and “crazy” because of 
their hallucinations, delusions, or split personality. In the same vein, Ion 
Copoeru[32] shows that clinical and public views of addiction also go hand in hand, 
are not sufficiently grounded, generate stigma, and are not helpful to persons 
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needing treatment. Both Katschnig and Copoeru press the point that these patients 
self-stigmatize and avoid seeking treatment on account of the negative moral load 
assigned to these diseases in popular culture. In this context, Copoeru speaks of 
categorization as a form of violence, and looks into phenomenological resources for 
alternative ways to portray addiction. He gives an account of addiction based on 
capabilities, instead of deficit, highlighting the point also raised in Pârvan’s paper 
that proper ways to care for persons cannot be based on deficit, or clinical categories 
that by force emphasize defect and dysfunction. Misperceived as weak-willed and 
less of a human, the addict can be seen as assuming, in fact, a practical power in 
addiction, a habitual form of doing things that affirms him as a subject that does not 
lack control and fights annihilation. Looking from the perspective of the addict’s lived 
body, non-pathologizable experience of temporality and embodied relation with the 
world and others, an account of addiction can be given that does not do violence to 
the persons included in this category.  Furthermore, that account would be based on 
their lived experiences rather than moral judgements, and focused on their 
capacities and their inclusion in the community of fellow humans. 
 
The last two papers in this section are also concerned with this communal inclusion 
and the healing potential it possesses, as well as the capacities of people challenged 
by mental illness to live a good life. Diana Heney[33] submits that, either as a 
clinician or a member of the community, one could usefully adopt the revised, non-
perfectionist version of Aristotelian constitutivism that she advances, which claims 
that the imperfect rationality of the mentally disordered does not preclude their 
possibility to flourish as human beings. Using George Graham’s account of mental 
disorder[64], she argues that “truncated rationality” keeps open for these people the 
possibility to live “a life high in well-being”, all the while admitting with Aristotle that 
rationality is the constitutive norm of human nature, and required, though not in 
perfect degree, for human flourishing. To learn more about how reason can be 
redeemable, how we can build ideals of rationality and recovery and how, as 
members of the community, we can practice a caring constitutivism toward the 
disordered, we can turn to patient narratives.  
 
This step is taken by Șerife Tekin and Simon Outram[34] in their analysis of patient 
memoirs. Like Heney, they are interested in recovery and the role of community; like 
Copoeru, they look at patient experiences and discuss the unsettled relation between 
stigma and the categorization of mental illness as a biochemical entity. Tekin and 
Outram use patient narratives to identify types of resources for coping and recovery 
in disorders such as depression, bipolarity, ADHD and schizophrenia, and then 
explore these findings against the backdrop of a model of care employed in 
developing countries to address schizophrenic persons. Three common components 
stand out: community inclusion and performance of social role or job; regular, 
healing group activities; attitudes toward mental illness in family and community. 
The authors conclude, along the line of a patient statement, that finding “the life 
that’s right for you” is more important than recovery. In light of Heney’s and 
Pârvan’s arguments, one could say that achieving that life is, in fact, a form of 
personal recovery. Living a good life with illness, even if it is not a life good for 
everyone, is one’s personal and continuous manner to recover or flourish (Heney), or 
find “the electric”, the way to be well in illness and live a full, personally-constructed, 
unique human life (Pârvan), which is, as all these papers and patient reports agree, 
a challenge for everyone. 
 
The Guidelines Challenge 
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This section follows from a conference held by the CauseHealth philosophy project, 
which aims to elucidate the ways that theories of causation influence the practice 
and policy of healthcare today. The Guidelines Challenge conference took on the 
specific issue of the increasing dependence upon guidelines in healthcare, as they 
shape the standards of practice and are used to create policy, a direct result of the 
continuing dominance of the EBM paradigm. Throughout the papers in this section, 
written by invited keynotes and CauseHealth collaborators who spoke at the 
conference, the importance of relating the underlying theory—philosophy—to the 
actual practical and political outcomes of healthcare guidelines is a common theme. 
 
The first two papers make the shape and aims of the conference itself clear. The 
conference report[35] was written by core CauseHealth project members, Rani Lill 
Anjum, Samantha Copeland, Roger Kerry and Elena Rocca. The report not only 
summarizes the key points of each talk and the themes into which the talks were 
grouped, but also draws out and reflects upon the main messages conveyed by the 
speakers and the discussion that occurred during the conference. Participants were 
from many of the realms of healthcare: practitioners of diverse fields and 
representing diverse patient populations, academics both in favour and critical of 
EBM approaches, and representing a diversity of disciplines within the clinical 
sciences, social sciences, biological sciences, and humanities. The key messages 
were several, but a particular emphasis was placed on questions about how we can 
and ought to make conclusions about causal relationships—a basic component of any 
guideline meant to give good advice about what is best to do—given the evidence we 
have. Critiques of over-reliance on randomized controlled trials were balanced with 
critical assessments of how to assess, integrate and access evidence that is both 
nuanced and context- as well as patient-dependent. 
 
The second paper, by Rani Lill Anjum, introduces the conference with a review of the 
challenges identified by the project core team to frame the discussion.[36] Anjum 
provides a summary and reflection upon the interaction between philosophy, practice 
and policy that the conference sought to bring to the fore and work within in respect 
to guidelines. Anjum also describes the CauseHealth objectives and how the project’s 
grounding philosophy has been refined through years of collaboration and discussion.  
In particular, she develops the impact of taking a dispositional approach to causation 
on how we might view the challenges that guidelines present to practice and policy, 
and on the solutions we might propose. A dispositional approach to causality 
emphasises features such as “causal complexity, context sensitivity, individual 
variation, causal interference, causal singularism, and individual propensities.” It 
thus stands in opposition to positivist norms, such as those emphasised in most EBM 
approaches, which give priority to data over theory, to quantitative over qualitative 
methods, to statistical tools over clinical judgement, and to the frequency of 
outcomes in populations over individual and context-dependent propensities. Anjum 
further draws out the impact of dispositionalism on the norms we ought to have for 
science in general. 
 
Trish Greenhalgh provides the perspective of a practitioner and academic working to 
change evidence based approaches to medicine, so that they better represent the 
complexity and context-dependency of the clinical encounter with individual 
patients.[37] To do this, she draws from her own experience as a patient, in a 
narrative that reflects on both clinician and patient perspectives of the same 
experience, telling a story shaped by the use and misuse of healthcare guidelines. 
This paper emphasises the importance of looking for the truth beyond the obvious. 
For instance, Greenhalgh highlights how she was grouped primarily according to her 
Page 11 of 20 Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice
For peer review only
age at the time of a serious fall from her bicycle, putting her into the category of 
patients who had fallen whilst over a certain age, and for this reason her treatment 
wrongly followed that guideline instead of the more appropriate guideline for falls 
taken by athletes who suffered a head injury. As she points out, this is one way that 
standardizing patients—or moving from the general to the particular—tends to go 
wrong in contemporary practice guided by EBM and healthcare guidelines. As in 
other work, here Greenhalgh seeks to push EBM to take up the methods and needs 
of practising clinicians, who ought to be encouraged to “practice case-based moral 
reasoning”—a key component of clinical judgement—as much or more than the kind 
of rationality (based on classification and rule-following) that tends to be over-valued 
by EBM approaches.  
 
In her discussion of “What evidence should guidelines take note of?”[38] the 
philosopher of science, Nancy Cartwright, provides a theoretical assessment of the 
rationality we need in order to best practice what Greenhalgh would call “real 
EBM”.[65]  She specifically takes up the question raised by CauseHealth, “How do we 
incorporate more types of causally relevant information in guidelines?” Rather than 
provide a single method for incorporating more types of such evidence, she first 
provides a philosophical argument in support of the need to do so, and then reviews 
some alternatives and, so far, neglected methods that would be useful to that end. 
Cartwright focuses on demonstrating that randomized controlled trials (RCTs) “do 
not tell us much”—rather, they give us ideal information, on populations that are not 
the same as the one to which an individual patient is likely to belong. Some of the 
alternative methods for determining relevant causal relationships she then provides 
are “clinchers”—they give the means for deductively assessing causality—and some 
are “vouchers”—giving us good reasons to draw a conclusion even if we cannot be 
absolutely certain that the effect will follow. In either case, they are more useful for 
guidelines developers and users than RCTs.  
 
Anna Luise Kirkengen draws on her experience as a general practitioner to highlight 
the importance of getting to know individual patients over time to understanding 
how to categorize the illnesses of those patients.[39] Specifically, Kirkengen 
emphasises the impact of multimorbidity on the practitioner’s ability to apply 
guidelines, insofar as those guidelines tend to reflect an assumption grounding EBM 
approaches, that illness categories can be delineated even when they are 
simultaneously experienced by an individual patient. In co trast to this, the 
narratives provided in this paper show that different causes interact within an 
individual to produce a medical condition that can only be understood—and thus can 
only be effectively treated—by seeing the patient as a whole, and never by 
attempting to break that whole up into fragments of independent diseases and 
disorders. 
 
Along the same lines, Karin Mohn Engebretsen shares the understanding she has 
gained through her phenomenological study of people suffering from burn out.[40] 
Like multimorbidity, medically unexplained syndromes such as burn out tend to fall 
outside of the lines drawn by guidelines, which rely on a close relationship between 
diagnosis and intervention. During the interviews from which statements about the 
experience of burn out are drawn within this paper, Engebretsen found that the 
pressure upon practitioners to diagnose and treat their patients often led to the 
misuse of guidelines. For instance, the tendency to take one of the symptoms of 
burn out, depression, as determining the appropriate guideline to follow and thereby 
the nature of the intervention, through anti-depressant medication, tended to worsen 
rather than improve the condition and thereby the life of the patient. Engebretsen 
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describes her own phenomenological approach to burn out to highlight the harm that 
can be caused when we fail to see “both mechanisms and the whole person…within 
his or her environment as individual, relational, and contextual.”  
 
In the final paper of this section, Mike Kelly draws on his first-hand experience as a 
guidelines developer to discuss the intellectual history of EBM, and its impact on the 
development of institutions (such as the Cochrane collaboration and NICE) that now 
determine the policy and practice of medicine in the UK and elsewhere.[41] The 
dominance of the RCT in EBM owes much to its empiricist intellectual heritage, in 
particular the work of the philosopher David Hume. Hume's analysis of causal 
explanation focussed on “association” rather than a rational explanation of 
underlying mechanisms, and this influence led to a focus on statistical reasoning and 
general patterns – generating great progress but leading inevitably to questions 
about how to apply the evidence from RCTs to patients who are “heterogeneous” 
biologically, psychologically and socially. 
 
To respond to these questions, Kelly proposes a “rationalist turn” in EBM. He 
contends that rationalism, understood as the principle that theoretical understanding 
grounds our interpretations of empirical, or observational, evidence, has always 
played a role in EBM. By recognising this explicitly, EBM can shed the constraints of 
its own “empiricist orthodoxy.” Consequently, the challenges being presented to EBM 
by contemporary theorists, practitioners and guidelines developers, such as the 
“knotty problem of judgement”, are more easily resolved. As Kelly points out in his 
conclusion, what is needed is for as much effort to be expended by the proponents of 
EBM on these complex problems with rationalist roots as has been expended on 
refining empirical methods such as the clinical trial.  These points, regarding 
rationalism, judgement and mechanism in EBM, are taken up by contributors to the 
next section of this edition. 
 
Mechanisms in Medicine 
 
While EBM has focused much attention on population-level research for the 
advancement and practice of medicine, the role of mechanistic understanding and 
reasoning has lately garnered some attention.  Russo and Williamson have argued 
that both mechanistic understanding and statistical, difference-making evidence are 
normally required to determine causality in medicine.[66]  Beyond causality, 
philosophers and clinicians are exploring ways mechanistic reasoning may inform 
other aspects of medical practice, including drug discovery and regulation as well as 
clinical decision making.  In July of 2017, scholars interested in employing evidence 
of mechanism in medicine met at a conference in Canterbury, UK. Participants from 
that conference have contributed three pieces to this issue. 
 
Jeffrey Aronson and colleagues argue that, despite a dependence upon RCTs, 
mechanistic evidence rightly enters into every step of the drug development and 
approval process.[42] While currently mechanism may implicitly or surreptitiously 
enter into deliberations that claim to be focused on empirical clinical research alone, 
the authors convincingly advocate for a more systematic and explicit incorporation of 
mechanistic evidence. 
 
Using apoptosis, the process of programmed cell death, as an example, Stavros 
Ioannidis and Stathis Psillos attempt to redefine mechanism in biomedical 
science.[43] These authors reject the common ontological view, one that sees 
mechanisms as entities themselves, arguing instead that a theoretically described 
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causal pathway is sufficient to describe a biomedical mechanism. Such a 
methodological definition of mechanism would allow for early incorporation of 
mechanism into medical reasoning, though does not address what evidentiary value 
a purely or mostly theoretical mechanism might have for scientific inference or 
clinical decision making. 
 
Elena Rocca considers the kind of evidence that best supports decision-making in 
clinical practice.[44] This author notes that proponents of EBM rely on evidence of 
associations from population studies alone. This reliance is born of scepticism of the 
epistemic value of the evidence for mechanisms of causal relationships. Scepticism 
arises because evidence of mechanisms reflects judgements that depend on 
incomplete background knowledge external to the research evidence being 
evaluated. To answer this scepticism Rocca discusses the example of the effect of 
oestrogen replacement therapy on coronary heart disease. She indicates how 
evaluations based on even the best study designs necessarily imply making such 
judgements, which are fallible and should therefore always be kept under scrutiny. 
 
GRADE 
 
The issues covered in the important conferences discussed above are given a 
specific, applied focus in the following section.  How to translate research findings to 
clinical practice so that patients may benefit from that knowledge has long been a 
challenge to health care providers.  Evidence based clinical practice guidelines have 
become a common tool by which to translate research to practice.  The Grading of 
Recommendations, Assessment, Development and Evaluation (GRADE) framework 
has been widely adopted as the preferr d method for developing guidelines. 
However, the GRADE framework has thus far received little in the way of 
philosophical scrutiny. 
 
In the first article of this section, Peter Wyer examines the strengths and 
weaknesses of the GRADE framework, as well as the critiques of GRADE presented in 
this section of the Journal, in a historical context.[45]  Wyer notes that GRADE was 
in many ways (and perhaps ironically) a response to an emphasis by guideline panels 
on study design, with little attention to the quality or reliability of the research, and a 
failure of those panels to distinguish between the rating of the research evidence and 
the strength of the recommendation.  Despite advances in guideline development 
made by GRADE, the framework has raised new problems and challenges.  Wyer 
offers suggestions that may advance the GRADE framework further.  Perhaps most 
important, he raises the notion that it may be time that structured processes for 
guideline development elevate social processes for decision making above research 
evidence. 
 
Next, Mathew Mercuri and Amiram Gafni present a three article series examining the 
evolution of the GRADE framework.[46-48]  The authors note that GRADE has 
undergone several modifications since it was first presented in 2004.  This series 
highlights three important issues with the GRADE framework.  First, absent in GRADE 
is theoretical and/or empirical justification for why the presented criteria for 
determining the quality of evidence and the components for determining the strength 
of a recommendation were included in the framework, and others excluded.  Second, 
many of the criteria/components are not clearly defined, nor is it clear how to 
operationalize them.  Finally, it is not clear how one integrates the criteria/ 
components when using the framework.  Mercuri and Gafni advise that until such 
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time that these issues are resolved, enthusiasm for the GRADE framework should be 
tempered. 
 
In the next article, Mercuri and colleagues challenge the logic of the GRADE 
framework and its conceptualization as a method for assessing evidence.[49]  Here, 
the authors critically examine the basic structure of the framework.  They claim that 
application of GRADE is reliant on the judgement of the user.  The authors note some 
implications such judgement has on both GRADE’s structure and status as the best 
available method for determining the quality of evidence and strength of a 
recommendation.  First, if one has the necessary knowledge to exercise good 
judgement about the quality of evidence, then the need for criteria proposed by 
GRADE might seem redundant.  Second, if judgement is required of the user, then it 
is not clear how GRADE is better than other systems that also rely on judgement. 
 
Returning to the issue of how one judges the quality of evidence, Mercuri and Baigrie 
examine the GRADE notion of confidence in the estimate of effect of a therapy 
through a Bayesian lens.[50]  Their analysis shines light on the rigidity of the criteria 
for determining the quality of evidence, which the authors believe is out of step with 
our intuitions about evidence.  Their conclusion is that more should be done in the 
GRADE framework to ensure that assessments of confidence in the effect estimate 
are based on the whole body of evidence, and that such confidence is proportional to 
the evidence. 
 
The examination of GRADE rounds out with a debate on incorporating fast-and-frugal 
decision trees (FFT) into the process of guideline development to improve clinical 
care.  Ben Djulbegovic and colleagues argue that the usefulness of guidelines, and 
our ability to assess them in practice, are limited by their lack of theoretical 
structure.[51]  The authors argue that FFT may provide the needed structure.  
Djulbegovic et al. believe that the benefit of guidelines for clinical practice may be 
realized by converting guidelines and clinical pathways into FFTs.  Mercuri[52] agrees 
that the proposal by Djulbegovic et al. may do much to improve our ability to assess 
the appropriate use of guidelines in practice, but believes it falls short in providing 
guideline panels with a theoretical basis to justify what is considered and how when 
developing a guideline (an issue raised in the three article series by Mercuri and 
Gafni[46-48], described above).  Upshur[53] questions whether the binary logic of 
FFTs is appropriate for clinical decision making.  Furthermore, Upshur raises the 
crucial issue of whether guidelines are indeed the answer to clinical problems or if 
care is just about decision making.  Indeed, the usefulness of FFTs (and for that 
matter addressing the concerns with GRADE raised by Wyer, and Mercuri and 
colleagues) is predicated on where one stands on the questions raised by Upshur.  
 
Book reviews 
 
As noted in the previous JECP philosophy thematic edition,[1] the growing literature 
on medical philosophy is extremely diverse and arguably establishes the area as a 
field of inquiry distinct from its origins in medical ethics and bioethics – a point 
confirmed by Mark Tonelli in the first book review in this edition.[54] Tonelli reviews 
The Bloomsbury Companion to Contemporary Philosophy of Medicine, edited by 
James Marcum.  This important collection gathers together over a dozen original 
papers by a group of both established and emerging philosophers of medicine. 
Sandwiched between an introductory chapter that offers an outstanding survey of 
the most salient philosophical issues facing medicine, and a concluding chapter that 
attempts to predict new directions for the field, are stand-alone papers on specific 
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areas of ongoing debate. Tonelli notes that overall, the work can be seen as not only 
a convincing assertion of the relevance of philosophy to modern medicine, but as a 
call to action for philosophers to engage with biomedical scientists and clinicians. 
 
Cosima Locher and colleagues[55] review Robin Nunn's After placebo: In Medical 
Research and Clinical Practice.  Nunn argues that the time has come to abandon the 
placebo construct altogether, to build a “post-placebo paradigm,” in which the 
concept of placebo will be as unrecognisable as “the structures of ancient medicine” 
are today. Locher et al review Nunn's comprehensive empirical and theoretical 
arguments for this radical conclusion, finding his contribution to the somewhat 
protracted debate about terminology in placebo studies to be “refreshingly original”. 
Whether or not we support his position (and the reviewers are by no means certain 
that it is really necessary to eradicate the language of placebo as Nunn proposes) 
this is an intellectually significant contribution.  They note that its clear, engaging 
and evocative style make it an accessible read for an interdisciplinary healthcare 
audience. 
 
James Tabery’s book Beyond Versus: The Struggle to Understand the Interaction of 
Nature and Nurture deals with the long discussed relation between genes and 
environment, which he considers causative of human behaviour and disease, as well 
as with the corresponding need to design interventions that take into account this 
relation, rather than considering genes only. Șerife Tekin's review [56] takes 
Tabery’s findings further, as she develops her own concept of “genenthusiasm”, 
defined as the propensity to grant causative power (exclusively) to genes, and ignore 
or neglect the gene-environment interaction as a relevant causal power. As Tabery’s 
position is examined, the impact of genenthusiasm on education, parenting, stigma, 
bioethics, and even distribution of research funding is explored. Thus, the review 
gives readers an account of both Tabery’s views and Tekin’s own ideas for new 
research that can further develop this line of inquiry. 
 
Debates 
 
Lex Rutten's paper on “flawed statistics” [57] responds to Lytsy's paper on 
“statistical evidence of the untrue” in the previous thematic edition of this 
journal.[67] Lytsy argued that testing impossible hypotheses is detrimental to 
science, regarding homeopathy as one such impossible hypothesis.  Drawing 
analogies with initial responses to Copernican cosmology, Rutten maintains that 
Lytsy “confuses paradigm with truth”, ignoring signs that “his paradigm is 
incomplete”.  He accuses critics of homeopathy of inconsistency in their use of 
scientific method and RCTs, noting that homeopathy is “an interesting case for 
evaluating the scientific method”.  It is interesting to consider this exchange in the 
context of the papers on mechanisms and Kelly's paper on EBM and rationalism[41] 
in this edition. 
 
Future instalments? 
 
Something important is happening in applied, interdisciplinary research, particularly 
in the field of applied health research.  The vast array of papers in this edition are 
evidence of a broad change in thinking across an impressive range of practice and 
academic areas.  The problems of complexity, the rise of chronic conditions, over-
diagnosis, co- and multi-morbidity are serious and challenging, but we are rising to 
that challenge.  Key conceptions regarding science, evidence, disease, clinical 
judgement, health and social care, are being revised and their relationships 
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reconsidered: boundaries are indeed being redrawn;[68] reasoning is being made 'fit 
for practice'[69].  Ideas like 'person-centred care' are no longer phrases with 
potential to be helpful in some yet-to-be-clarified way[70]: theorists and 
practitioners are working in collaboration to give them substantive import and 
application. 
 
The next instalment is of course not yet written.  That is the work of our excellent 
readers and contributors, and we look forward to it. 
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